Some Suggested Topics in the Field of Tax Administration by Surrey, Stanley S.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 25 Issue 3 
January 1940 
Some Suggested Topics in the Field of Tax Administration 
Stanley S. Surrey 
United States Treasury Department 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stanley S. Surrey, Some Suggested Topics in the Field of Tax Administration, 25 WASH. U. L. Q. 399 (1940). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss3/26 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
TAX ADMINISTRATION
Saturday Afternoon, Febrzuary 17
SOME SUGGESTED TOPICS IN THE FIELD
OF TAX ADMINISTRATION
STANLEY S. SURREYt
In recent years the approach to federal income tax adminis-
tration has largely been in terms of generalities and platitudes.
All difficulties are usually said to be traceable to a lack of ade-
quate personnel in the Bureau of Internal Revenue and to a soak-
the-taxpayer policy characterized by a devotion to dollars rather
than to principles of tax law. The sure cure is claimed to lie
in the development of an independent, intelligent, fearless per-
sonnel willing to make the right decision regardless of revenue
loss and regardless of possible criticism from officers standing
higher in the Bureau hierarchy. We are also reminded that some-
where there exists the simplified, stable, unchanging revenue act
which will solve all our troubles, though any experienced tax
technician would sadly admit that this objective cannot be at-
tained. Of late there has developed a tendency to mitigate some-
what the blame fastened upon the Bureau through recognition
of the fact that at times the taxpayer may be at fault. As a
consequence the nurturing of a willing attitude among taxpayers
has been proclaimed as a wise policy of tax administration. No
one can deny that it is the part of tax wisdom to strive con-
stantly to improve the quality and attitude of Bureau personnel
and to impress upon taxpayers the extent and seriousness of
their obligation of self-assessment. But it takes more than men
of good will to administer successfully a revenue system which
produces seven million income tax returns annually. Even a
highly efficient, smoothly working tax machine would be sub-
jected to a severe strain by this constant volume of tax returns.
There are many who think that the present machine is so far
from adequate that it will break down unless long-overdue re-
t B.S., College of the City of New York, 1929; LL.B., Columbia Univer-
sity, 1932. Assistant Legislative Counsel, United States Treasury Depart-
ment. Although the author is employed by the United States Treasury
Department, the views set forth herein are entirely his own and in no way
indicate the views of the Treasury Department.
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pairs are made. The growing discrepancy between the volume
of returns and the machinery for their administration cannot
be met by thinking only in terms of a highly-skilled personnel,
and other long-range, nearly evolutionary changes. The realities
of the situation demand more immediate pragmatic action in an
endeavor to make the current administration of income, estate,
and gift taxes serve more effectively both the taxpayers and the
Government. In this article an attempt will be made to sketch
some of the fields in which the students of tax administration
may play.
I. PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE-
NEW DECENTRALIZATION PROGRAM
In the December, 1938 issue of the Columbia Law Review,'
Professor Traynor of the University of California School of
Jurisprudence critically surveyed the then existing administra-
tive procedure and found results which he believed were indic-
ative of serious defects. He noted that at the close of the fiscal
year 1937-1938 there were 8,553 cases involving $513,985,520
pending before the Board of Tax Appeals, and the courts that
review its decisions.2 He then pointed out that 70 per cent of
the dockets of the Board of Tax Appeals were settled by agree-
ment of the parties without action by the Board.3 The majority
of the cases so settled had taken from four to five years for their
termination.4 The remaining 30 per cent of the dockets were
on the average decided by the Board six years after the tax year
involved. 5 It was apparent that the dockets in which a Board
decision was essential to a solution were hopelessly caught in a:
jam of cases which did not require judicial action but which had
been permitted to cross over into the judicial stage through the
failure of the prior administrative machinery to function prop-
1. Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income,
Estate, and Gift Taxes-A Criticism and a Proposal (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev.
1393. See also Surrey, The Traynor Plan-What It Is (1939) 17 Taxes 393.
2. Traynor, supra note 1, at 1393. At the close of the fiscal year 1938-
1939 there were 7,864 cases pending, involving $456,974,846.
3. In the fiscal year 1937-1938, out of 5,799 dockets closed in the Board
of Tax Appeals, 4,273 or 73.6 per cent were closed by agreement. Traynor,
supra note 1, at 1394, and n. 3. In the fiscal year 1938-1939, out of 5,885
dockets closed, 4,158 or 70.6 per cent were closed by agreement.
4. Traynor, supra note 1, at 1394.
5. Traynor, supra note 1, at 1393. The figure in the text was based upon
a survey of cases closed in 1934. A survey of the cases closed in 1939 would.
probably disclose that the six year period had been reduced to five.
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erly. A Board which at best can dispose of a little over a thou-
sand cases a year through decision, and which at the close of
the fiscal year 1937-1938 had 7,414 dockets pending before it,"
was being subjected to an annual flood of 5,000 petitions, 7 so
that its ability to function at all depended on the settlement
policy of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Another evidence of
a basic weakness was the number of petitions relating to small
amounts of tax, less than $5,000 being involved in 57.4 per cent
of the petitions and less than $2,000 in 25.9 per cent., Still an-
other significant fact was that the Commissioner was forced to
abandon about 70 per cent in amount of the deficiencies asserted
in his ninety-day letters-the Technical Staff conceded 64.4 per
cent in amount, the Appeals Division of the Chief Counsel's office
conceded 68.6 per cent and there was a reduction in amount by
Board decision of 74.2 per cent. Stated differently, in the Board
of Tax Appeals dockets closed either by settlement or decision of
the Board and the reviewing courts, the net amount recovered
by the Government was 32.6 per cent of the amount in contro-
versy."
Here then was evidence of excessive deficiencies, inability of
the administrative machinery to handle a large number of the
cases until they had become judicial proceedings, and consequent
delay in the termination of both these cases and the proceed-
ings which were the proper objects of Board consideration. These
conditions were regarded as the result of three interacting causes
-the elaborate machinery for the administrative review of con-
troversies, the inability of the Commissioner to obtain the neces-
sary factual information, and, partly in consequence thereof, the
6. Traynor, supra note 1, at 1396. At the close of the fiscal year 1938-
1939, there were 6,574 dockets pending.
7. In the fiscal year 1937-1938, there were 4,912 petitions filed and 5,799
dockets closed, of which 1,108 or 19.1 per cent were closed by decision of
the Board. Traynor, supra note 1, at 1396. In the fiscal year 1938-1939,
there were 4,854 petitions filed and 5,885 dockets closed of which 1,311 or
22.2 per cent were closed by decision.
8. Traynor, supra note 1, at 1398, n. 12. The figures in the text are for
the end of the fiscal year 1937-1938. As respects the fiscal year 1938-1939,
56.1 per cent of the petitions involved less than $5,000 and 38.4 per cent
less than $2,000.
9. Traynor, supra note 1, at 1399, n. 13. The figures in the text are
annual averages for the fiscal years 1935-1936, 1936-1937, and 1937-1938.
In the fiscal year 1938-1939, the Technical Staff conceded 59.5 per cent in
amount, the Appeals Division conceded 75.1 per cent, and there was a
reduction by Board decisions of 87.8 per cent. The net amount recovered
was 33.6 per cent of the amount in controversy.
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Commissioner's resort to vague and indefinite deficiency letters.
Professor Traynor suggested that these difficulties be met by
adoption of the following procedure: The importance of the pre-
liminary conferences between the taxpayer and the Bureau repre-
sentatives would be emphasized and every effort made to encour-
age an amicable settlement of a tax controversy in that stage.
If a settlement were not arrived at, the taxpayer would be given
an opportunity to file a protest, but in default of such filing the
claimed deficiency would be immediately assessed. The protest
would contain a complete factual statement 6f the taxpayer's
case together with a list of relevant documents and of those per-
sons having knowledge of the facts stated in the protest. A
conference, conducted by the most capable tax technicians in the
Bureau, wbuld then be held on the protest. If this conference
likewise failed to terminate the controversy, the Commissioner
would issue a ninety-day letter or notice of deficiency, which
would be accompanied by specific findings of fact. If the tax-
payer then chose to take his case to the Board, he would be
limited to the grounds, documents, and facts outlined in his
protest. The Commissioner would correspondingly be limited to
the issues and facts contained in his findings of fact and could
not present a claim for an additional deficiency. In exceptional
and justifiable cases the Board might relax these restrictions to
permit the introduction of new facts or a different method of
approach to the issues involved. The deficiency procedure and
the refund procedure would be coordinated so as to eliminate the
existing differences and to make it largely immaterial over which
procedural route the case travelled. Finally, to reduce the loss
in revenue resulting from the uncollectibility of about 11 per
cent of the deficiencies determined by the Board, a bond or other
security would have to be posted by the taxpayer before filing
his petition unless such requirement was waived by the Board.
No attempt has been made to state Professor Traynor's pro-
posals in full, for we are not here concerned with an intensive
analysis of them. He offered these suggestions, not as definitive
solutions, but in order to stimulate critical discussion of the seri-
ous problems presented by the existing procedure. Nearly all
of the discussion which followed, however, was levelled at Pro-
fessor Traynor's proposals and evaded the problems with which
he was concerned, although their existence was generally con-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss3/26
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ceded.1- Many of the criticisms appear to result from miscon-
ceptions of his recommendations. Thus, it was pointed out that
the great bulk of the income tax controversies are settled admin-
istratively prior to petition to the Board. Of these controversies,
198,531 cases or 98.2 per cent are settled before petition to the
Board, the remaining 1.8 per cent representing settlements after
petition to the Board.1 It was contended that the rigid require-
ments of the formal protest would prevent settlement of these
cases. But this criticism completely overlooks Professor Tray-
nor's statement that the protest procedure would in practice
apply not to the 98.2 per cent of the cases now settled prior
to the petition to the Board, but only to about 5,000 cases-the
1.8 per cent disposed of administratively after petition to the
Board (3,688 cases) plus the cases terminated by Board deci-
sion on the merits (about 1,175 cases) .12 It is the administra-
tive procedure applicable to this latter group of cases, which
today go to the Board and the courts, that is of vital importance
and with which Professor Traynor was primarily concerned. The
attempt to dismiss the problem by stating that less than 1/10th
of 1 per cent of the controversies end up in the Board of Tax
Appeals is a failure to observe that it is precisely this small
fraction of cases which has placed $513,985,520 in litigation and
whose delayed solution for a six-year average period is the major
problem."
10. The articles discussing Professor Traynor's proposals are: Young-
quist, Proposed Radical Changes in the Federal Tax Machinery (1939) 25
A. B. A. J. 291; Seidman, Proposed Procedural Changes in Federal Tax
Practice (1939) 67 J. of Accountancy 221; Prettyman, Comment on the
Traynor Plan for Revision of Federal Tax Procedure (1939) 27 Geo. L. J.
1038; Angell, Procedural Reform in the Judicial Review of Controversies
under the Internal Revenue Statutes: An Answer to a Proposal (1939)
34 Ill. L. Rev. 151; also discussion on these proposals at the Eighth Tax
Clinic of the A. B. A. Committee on Federal Taxation, reported in (1939)
17 Taxes 390, at 429 et. seq.
11. Traynor, supra note 1, at 1394. The figures in the text are the annual
averages for the fiscal years 1935-1936, 1936-1937, and 1937-1938.
12. Traynor, supra note 1, at 1394, 1936, and 1414, n. 41. The figures
in the text are the annual averages for the fiscal years 1935-1936, 1936-1937,
and 1937-1938. At the most, the protest would only be used in those cases
in which deficiency letters are now issued. There were 10,241 deficiency
letters issued under the income tax in the fiscal year 1937-38, and 13,288
in 1938-1939.
13. Traynor, supra note 1, at 1393. The figure in the text is the total
amount involved in the cases, 8,553 in number, pending before the Board
and the courts that review its decisions at the end of the fiscal year 1937-
1938. At the end of the fiscal year 1938-1939 the amount was $456,974,846
for 7,864 cases.
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Again, criticism was directed at the proposal that findings of
fact be issued by the Commissioner on the ground that if the
proposal were adopted the taxpayer would be placed entirely at
the mercy of the Commissioner. This criticism ignored the fact
that these findings were proposed as a limitation upon the Com-
missioner, with the objective of providing the taxpayer with a
definitive statement of the case asserted against him. Moreover,
it was nowhere suggested by Professor Traynor that the find-
ings of fact be final if supported by evidence. While the burden
of proof to upset the findings would rest upon the taxpayer, the
findings would be tested by the weight of evidence and not, as
is the case generally with respect to the findings of administra-
tive tribunals, by whether there was evidence to support them.
Other critics made much of the argument that the taxpayer
would be forced to hire a lawyer or an expert accountant and
would no longer be able to tilt unassisted against the Bureau.
In actual practice, however, the taxpayer has been his own law-
yer or accountant in only 4.2 per cent of the cases closed by the
Technical Staff, 6.7 per cent of the cases settled by the Appeals
Division, and 5.6 per cent of the cases decided by the Board, 14- -
the cases which would be principally affected by the protest re-
quirement.
It is difficult to understand the criticism of the suggestion
that the taxpayer be bound in the Board by the record he made
before the Commissioner, since that criticism is not extended to
the present procedure which binds the taxpayer in the circuit
court of appeals to the record made in the Board. Even as re-
gards the requirement of a bond or other security, concededly a
debatable point, the criticism neglected the fact that such a
requirement would hardly affect more than 15 per cent of the
taxpayers now filing petitions to the Board.1 Moreover, the
Board by waiving the requirement could easily take care of the
40 to 70 odd million dollar deficiency asserted in the Tex-Penn
case,16 the most frequently cited example, although hardly a
typical case.
14. Traynor, supra note 1, at 1417, n. 45.
15. Traynor, supra note 1, at 1434-5.
16. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tex-Penn Oil Co. (1937) 300
U. S. 481. The deficiency asserted by the Commissioner varied greatly at
different times, once reaching some 70-odd millions of dollars. The Board of
Tax Appeals found a deficiency of over $9 million dollars, which the circuit
court of appeals and the Supreme Court reduced to zero. Tex-Penn Oil Co.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 3, 1936) 83 F. (2d) 518.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss3/26
TAX ADMINISTRATION
Nevertheless, the suggestions of Professor Traynor are provo-
cative of many questions. As he himself observes, the protest
requirement might in some cases produce troublesome difficulties.
The limitations on Board review would require a highly intelli-
gent handling of the cases to insure their successful operation.
For these reasons, it is timely to consider a recent but funda-
mental development in the administration of income, estate, and
gift taxes which has within it the potentialities of a successful
solution to many of the present problems. This is the decentrali-
zation of the Technical Staff and the Appeals Division com-
menced in 1938 and concluded in 1939. As the new procedure
resulting from this decentralization is highly important, a de-
scription of it seems desirable.1'
The Internal Revenue Agents in Charge will continue as be-
fore to be responsible for the cases in their preliminary stages.
If investigation discloses that a deficiency should be asserted, the
Internal Revenue Agent in Charge will send the taxpayer a pre-
liminary thirty-day letter advising him of the proposed adjust-
ment in tax liability and of the opportunity to file a protest with-
in thirty days from the date of the letter.174 The taxpayer will
also be advised of his opportunity to obtain a hearing, if he so de-
sires, in the Office of the Internal Revenue Agent in Charge. If
a protest is filed and a conference held which produces an agree-
ment, or if the taxpayer agrees to the adjustment without filing
any protest, the Internal Revenue Agent in Charge has authority
to conclude the case. While the agreement is subject to review
in Washington, in only a small number of cases is the disposi-
tion of the case altered. If an agreement is not reached, the tax-
payer is notified of the deficiency that is proposed and of his
opportunity to obtain a hearing before the appropriate field divi-
sion of the Technical Staff. If the taxpayer does not avail him-
self of such opportunity, or did not in the first instance file a
protest after receiving the preliminary thirty-day letter, the
Internal Revenue Agent in Charge is authorized to send the tax-
17. See generally, Commissioner's Mimeograph, Coll. No. 4792, revised
January 4, 1939; Commissioner's Mimeograph, Coll. No. 4960, September
14, 1939; Commissioner's Mimeograph, R. A. No. 899, revised January 26,
1939; Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1939) 39-44.
17a. The protest referred to in the text need not contain the detailed
statement of the taxpayer's case that would be required under Professor
Traynor's plan.
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payer a final ninety-day statutory notice of deficiency in the
name of the Commissioner. A period of 120 days from the date
of the preliminary thirty-day letter is on the average allowed
for the consideration of the proceeding in the office of the In-
ternal Revenue Agent in Charge. There may, of course, be a
number of conferences and protests in this stage of the proceed-
ing.
If the taxpayer, after consideration of his protest by the In-
ternal Revenue Agent in Charge, desires a hearing before the
Technical Staff, he will be afforded one in the appropriate field
office of the Staff. There are ten field divisions of the Staff, each
of which has a defined territorial jurisdiction. There are several
local offices in each division. The personnel of each Staff Divi-
sion consists of a Head and an Assistant Head, designated by the
Commissioner, a Division Counsel and an Assistant Division
Counsel, designated by the Chief Counsel, and a number of tech-
nical advisors, attorneys, auditors and clerks. As indicated
above, each Staff Division will consider cases referred to it, at
the request of the taxpayer, by the Internal Revenue Agents in
Charge situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the Divi-
sion. The Staff Division will not consider, before the issuance
of the statutory notice of deficiency, any case in which no pro-
test has been filed with the Internal Revenue Agent in Charge,
or in which the taxpayer does not desire Staff consideration.
The Internal Revenue Agent in Charge may be represented at
such a hearing if he desires. If the taxpayer and the Technical
Staff agree on the disposition of the case, the Head of the Divi-
sion can conclude the case without the settlement being subject
to change in Washington. If an agreement is not reached, a
memorandum will be prepared in the Staff Division setting forth
the exact grounds upon which the proposed deficiency is asserted,
and, after its consideration by the Division Counsel, will be
transmitted to the Internal Revenue Agent in Charge. He will
then issue in the name of the Commissioner a statutory notice
of deficiency based upon such memorandum. The taxpayer after
receipt of such ninety-day letter may obtain a hearing before
the Staff Division in the ninety-day period only in very unusual
circumstances, such as a shift in legal interpretation or a change
in the Regulations.
Aftei the filing of a petition to the Board of Tax Appeals by
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a taxpayer, the Staff Division will generally afford the taxpayer
a hearing on his case in an effort to settle it administratively
if the taxpayer requests such hearing. This hearing, however,
will for the most part be conducted by the same persons who
considered the case prior to the issuance of the ninety-day let-
ter; while new conferees may be added, the former conferees
will also attend the conference. The Division Counsel will handle
before the Board of Tax Appeals (1) all cases which originate
within the Division and which are placed either on a calendar
for hearing within the territorial jurisdiction of the Division, on
the Washington calendar, or on the calendar for an adjoining
Division, and (2) all cases which, although originating in other
Divisions (except an adjoining Division), are placed on a calen-
dar for hearing within the territorial jurisdiction of the Division.
Any such case may be settled without hearing by the Board if
the Head of the Staff Division and the Division Counsel concur,
but if either thinks such settlement inadvisable the case must
proceed to a hearing before the Board. The Commissioner may
by written order withdraw from a Staff Division any case not
docketed before the Board and provide for its disposition under
his personal direction, and he together with the Chief Counsel
may withdraw a case docketed before the Board, but a copy of
such order and the reasons therefor must be furnished to the
Secretary. Aside from this exception, however, a taxpayer will
not be able to have his case considered in Washington. Substan-
tially the same procedure will be followed in refund cases as is
described above for the cases involving deficiencies, except that
refunds of over $20,000 agreed to by a Staff Division are sub-
ject to review in Washington.
Successful administration of this decentralized consideration
of the controverted cases should have several significant conse-
quences:
1. Prompt aiid effective disposition of cases by the Internal Reve-
nue Agents in Charge.
The Internal Revenue Agents in Charge should be able both
to dispose of the cases in their offices much more promptly and
to conclude a greater number of settlements. The taxpayer who
receives a thirty-day letter and the opportunity to file a protest
will realize that unless he files a protest the second ring of the
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postman means a deficiency letter. No longer can he delay until
the case has been forwarded to Washington and he is given a
new invitation to a conference. If he files the protest and reaches
an agreement with the Internal Revenue Agent in Charge, the
latter may close the case then and there. While his decision
is subject to review and change in Washington, it is upset in
only a few cases. Moreover, the Internal Revenue Agent in
Charge will be prompted to conclude a settlement rather than to
attempt to maintain an extreme position in view of the tax-
payer's right of immediate appeal to the Technical Staff. For
these reasons it is to be expected that many more settlements
will be concluded while the cases are in this preliminary stage.
The preliminary figures with respect to the first months of oper-
ation of the decentralization program confirm this expectation.
2. Improved deficiency letters.
The quality of deficiency letters should be considerably im-
proved. In the office of each Internal Revenue Agent in Charge,
one or two specially skilled persons will prepare all of the defi-
ciency letters in cases which do not have Technical Staff consid-
eration. In those cases which have been appealed by the tax-
payer to the Technical Staff, the deficiency letters will in effect
be prepared by the Technical Staff as respects the issues ap-
pealed to it by the taxpayer and will be checked by the attorneys
who would later be called upon to defend the letters before the
Board. This is a distinct departure from the previous practice,
for these technicians and attorneys in the past did not see the
deficiency letters until after they had turned into Board petitions.
The taxpayer's prayer for a deficiency letter which clearly states
the reason for the deficiency'8 seems about to be answered. In
addition, the percentage in amount of deficiencies sustained
either by Board decision or settlement after petition to the Board
should rise appreciably.
3. Fewer petitions to the Board.
Under the prior practice a case would obtain Technical Staff
consideration only after it had been converted into a Board peti-
tion. Under the new procedure, however, a hearing by this
skilled group is available to the taxpayer prior to the issuance
18. Paul, A Plea For Better Tax Pleading (1933) 18 Corn. L. Q. 507.
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of the deficiency letter. As consideration of his case will be made
by the same officials regardless of whether it occurs before or
after the filing of a petition, there will be no longer any ad-
vantage in this regard in postponing such consideration until
the later time. M'Ioreover, the Appeals Division attorneys who
must defend the cases before the Board will be able to assert
their legal views in the administrative stage and will not be
forced to concede the case at the last minute as they have been
at times compelled to do in the past. While there will always
be many cases settled subsequent to the filing of a petition, it
is to be expected that a significant number of the 70 per cent
of the Board dockets now settled without Board hearing will be
terminated in the administrative stage. The preliminary figures
point in this direction, for in the last six months of 1939 there
were 1,593 petitions filed with the Board, as compared with 2,049
in the corresponding period in 1938. The reduction in petitions
should break up the present congestion in the Board and permit
the cases requiring judicial consideration to flow more smoothly.
It must be noted, however, that in many instances the blame
for the delayed disposition of a case lies at the taxpayer's door.
A significant number of Board petitions are still being filed by
taxpayers who did not file a protest with the Internal Revenue
Agent in Charge, or, after a hearing by that official on their
protest, did not refer their cases to the Technical Staff. Some
of these cases involve only legal issues requiring judicial deci-
sion for their determination, so that administrative consideration
is ineffective. But in many instances the taxpayer with a poor
case files his petition in order to secure further time in the hope
that this deliberate delay may somehow yield a windfall. In
other cases a taxpayer who has obtained too favorable a con-
sideration by the Internal Revenue Agent in Charge on some of
the issues will not appeal the other issues to the Technical Staff,
for the Staff in reexamining the first issues may determine them
against him and he will thus bear the burden of proof in the
Board, whereas if these issues are reexamined after the filing
of a petition and an additional deficiency is consequently as-
serted, the burden of proof will then rest upon the Commissioner.
Further, a proper disposition of the case can not be made in
the administrative stage unless the taxpayer discloses all of the
relevant facts and documents. Thus, to an important degree the
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cure rests with the taxpayer as the administrative machinery is
available to him if he desires to utilize it.
As stated above, if either the Head of a Staff Division or the
Division Counsel believes settlement of a Board proceeding is
inadvisable, the case will be tried on the merits before the Board.
This aspect of the procedure has been criticized on the ground
that the attorney should be in supreme command of a docketed
case. This criticism is sought to be supported by reference to
the attorney-client relationship in private practice and to the
assertion that under such relationship the attorney must either
control the litigation or abandon his client. But whether or not
the assertion is a correct description of the situation in private
practice, it must be remembered that the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue and the Chief Counsel for the Bureau of Internal
Revenue stand in an unusually rigid relationship of attorney and
client. Each is a statutory Governmental officer, the office of
such is bound to the other by statutory ties, and neither officer
may abandon the other. Moreover, the criticism overlooks the
fact that the personnel in the field offices are representatives of
these officials and not the officials themselves. It is but natural,
to expect that there will be disagreements in some of the Board
cases, and consequently an operating rule is necessary to dispose
of such disagreements if the procedure is to function smoothly.
The rule adopted is that in the event of disagreement the case
must be tried on the merits before the Board. This solution ade-
quately protects the Government's interests under a decentral-
ized procedure and can hardly be objected to by the taxpayer
for he is merely required to submit his case to a judicial tribunal.
4. Better preparation for Board hearings.
In the past, the major portion of the work upon a Board case
was often done in the week or two preceding the day it was
scheduled to be heard. In many instances the Appeals Division
attorney who was to try the case first saw it at that time. Such
a procedure obviously made for insufficient preparation. But the
Appeals Division attorney now stationed in the field office is in
a position adequately to prepare his case prior to trial. Addi-
tional time, better spreading of the load, availability of wit-
nesses, and similar factors are responsible for this change. The
tax-payer will also benefit as increased knowledge on the part of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss3/26
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the Appeals Division attorney means more stipulations of fact
and shorter hearings. Many a case was dragged through a pro-
tracted hearing in the past because the Appeals Division attor-
ney was not sufficiently familiar with the case to consider a
stipulation of fact. Under the new procedure, however, there
is already a pronounced trend toward the increased use of stipu-
lations of fact. The Board of Tax Appeals will also benefit from
this development as it will be required to devote far less time
to consideration of factual issues. In addition, the increased
time available to the Appeals Division attorney for study of a
case will produce sounder settlements in cases which are con-
cluded without a Board hearing.
5. Increase in taxpayer convenience.
It should not take much argument to convince the taxpayer
who resides in St. Louis that it is far simpler to appear with
his attorney and his books and records before a Technical Staff
man in St. Louis than to proceed to Washington to discuss his
case. The decentralized procedure of the Bureau makes readily
accessible to the taxpayer a single, unified agency empowered
to exercise for the Commissioner all of the authority which the
Department or any of its branches possesses in the review of
protested tax determinations made by the Internal Revenue
Agents in Charge, in the settlement of contested cases, and in
the defense of proceedings before the Board. The savings in
time and expense, the increased opportunity for the taxpayer to
accompany his attorney if he desires, the speedier consideration
of cases, the incentive to rely upon documents and personal testi-
mony rather than correspondence-all are clear gains to the tax-
payer.
Mention may be made of several aspects of the decentraliza-
tion program which unless analyzed carefully may cause con-
cern. It has been contended that the substitution of ten field
divisions and thirty-eight offices of the Technical Staff for the
unit previously centralized in Washington will make for a lack
of uniformity in the consideration of cases. A moment's reflec-
tion will destroy the plausibility of this contention. To begin
with, consideration of the great majority of the cases has been
decentralized for years in the various offices of the Internal
Revenue Agents in Charge. The fact that the remaining cases
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were considered in Washington provided a surface appearance
of complete uniformity. But of necessity the Income Tax Unit
review in Washington was divided among at least five separate
audit review divisions, and the Technical Staff review was scat-
tered among at least twelve groups, each headed by a Senior
Technical Adviser. What has occurred through decentralization
is the substitution of 38 buildings in 38 cities for one building
in Washington. The same large number of men who are neces-
sary to effective disposition of the cases is still an integral part
of the procedure. If anything, an increased effort will be made
to obtain the maximum of uniformity through the improvement
of standards and yardsticks of general application. Every case
concluded in the Staff Divisions will be subjected to a "post re-
view" in Washington which, quite properly, will not disturb the
disposition of the cases reviewed but will insure that any diver-
gence from the accepted Bureau standards will not be repeated.
The Washington staff will likewise be on the alert to issue rul-
ings in situations in which a possible lack of uniformity may be
foreseen in the absence of direction from Washington. In addi-
tion, the various Staff Divisions may, and do, refer questions to
Washington where it is apparent that a lack of uniformity may
result from localized consideration.
Concern may arise as to the disposition of cases whose rami-
fications spread to several field divisions. Thus, a distribution
by a corporation may involve stockholders residing in many
States. Or a controversy may concern a trustee in one part of
the country and a beneficiary in another. A consolidated return
may involve corporations in several scattered States, or the re-
turn of a single corporation may relate to properties and busi-
nesses in various parts of the country. Yet the problems of coor-
dination which these situations present likewise existed under the
former procedure for initially these cases must be considered in
the various offices of the Internal Revenue Agents in Charge.
Procedures have been devised over the years to deal with these
cases, and these procedures are still in effect. If the proper
coordination has not been achieved by the time the case is con-
sidered by a Staff Division, that Division may competently deal
with the case through the aid of supplementary conferences held
under the auspices of the other Divisions.
The benefits of this decentralized procedure are so clear that
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it is natural to wonder that its appearance has been so long
delayed. Apart from the inertia of Government and taxpayers,
such a step had to await the slow growth of a centralized unit
sufficiently skilled and equipped to permit of its decentralization.
But it must be remembered, however, that the present decentral-
ization is but the culmination of a trend that has existed almost
from the start. In the first years of the income tax nearly the
entire administrative machinery was centralized in Washington.
This machinery proved inadequate to handle the large volume
of disputed cases resulting from the war years. Consequently,
in the early nineteen twenties the first step in the direction of
the decentralized consideration of tax controversies occurred
when the Internal Revenue Agents in Charge were authorized
to conduct conferences and settle disputed cases. The next step
was taken by the former Committee on Appeals and Review
when it adopted the practice of hearing cases outside of Wash-
ington. During the same period the Board of Tax Appeals was
slowly developing its circuit calendars. To keep pace with this
development, the Appeals Division was required to send its attor-
neys to the various cities in which Board hearings were being
held. The volume of settlement work in connection with the cir-
cuit calendars became so large that members of the Technical
Staff soon joined the Appeals Division attorneys on their field
trips. As a result, since 1933 decentralization existed in the
form of circuit riding by the Appeals Division attorneys and the
Technical Staff members. But this circuit riding provided many
administrative problems and was not very efficient. The present
decentralized procedure, which is clear-cut and absolute, reme-
dies these defects. The criticisms levelled against the present
system as an untested innovation in tax procedure are thus
clearly unwarranted when the system is viewed in its historical
perspective.
The development of the decentralized procedure now instituted
can still be marked in terms of months rather than years. While
the basic foundations of the decentralized procedure seem un-
questionably sound, problems are bound to arise in its day-by-
day application. The interests of sound tax administration re-
quire that the Bureau, the taxpayers, and all others concerned
strive to insure the proper solution of these problems so that
the promises of the decentralized procedure will be fulfilled.
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Professor Traynor recognized that his proposals depended upon
decentralized consideration of tax controversies and stated that
the proposals were but a logical extension of a program of decen-
tralization. Consequently, when more information becomes avail-
able as to the actual effects of the decentralized procedure, we
will be in a position to determine the desirability of adopting
Professor Traynor's proposals. While informative statistics on
the operation of the new procedure must necessarily await its
functioning over a period of time, such statistics should be care-
fully considered when they are issued. The tell-tale factors to
be watched are: the number of settlements in the Offices of the
Internal Revenue Agents in Charge; the number of deficiency
letters issued and petitions filed with the Board in cases having
had Technical Staff consideration, as compared with cases in
which a hearing was had only in the office of the Internal Reve-
nue Agent in Charge, and as compared with cases in which even
such latter hearing was not desired; the number of petitions
settled administratively without Board hearing; the reduction by
amount in the various steps of the procedure in deficiencies as-
serted; and the various time schedules.
II. JUDICIAL PROCEDURE-THE PROBLEMS OF
APPELLATE REVIEW
While many of the basic problems of administrative procedure
may be solved by the decentralization of the Technical Staff and
the Appeals Division, the difficulties caused by the complicated,
almost weird, pattern of judicial consideration of tax cases have
yet to be dealt with by either the Government or taxpayers.
Professor Traynor's article has already described these difficul-
ties at length. The judicial stage in tax cases is marked by an
excessive amount of litigation' caused by two principal factors-
19. In the fiscal year 1938-1939, tax cases constituted 14.3 per cent (97
out of 676) of the cases in which the United States was a party and in
which certiorari was denied by Supreme Court, 22.2 per cent (28 out of
126) of the cases decided in which the United States was a party (excluding
obligatory jurisdiction), and 13.5 per cent (125 out of 922) of all cases
acted upon in which the United States was a party. In the fiscal year 1937-
1938, the percentages respectively were 13.9 per cent (100 out of 718),
25.4 per cent (42 out of 165) and 14.1 per cent (142 out of 1004). In the
last term of the Court, 13 per cent of the Court's written opinions were
devoted to Federal taxation; for the last three terms, the percentages were
25, 18 and 30, respectively. In the fiscal year 1938-1939, 12 per cent or
391 of the 3206 cases decided by the circuit courts of appeals were tax
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the lack of uniformity resulting from the large number of tri-
bunals having original and appellate jurisdiction in tax cases and
the "conflict motif" engendered by the system of appellate re-
view of Board of Tax Appeals cases.
With respect to original jurisdiction in tax cases, the most
important tribunal is the Board of Tax Appeals, which is a'
specially-created agency composed of members possessing skilled
knowledge of ,tax law and deciding about 1,100 cases a year.2 0
But in addition there are 86 other tribunals which are relatively
unskilled in this field and which decide about 190 cases a year.21
eleven tribunals, the circuit courts of appeals and the Court of
Claims which together possess jurisdiction over refund cases
and suits against collectors, the Board being limited to deficiency
cases.2 2 While the vast majority of income, estate, and gift tax
eases, about 80 to 85 per cent in decided cases, proceed through
the Board of Tax Appeals, the availability of these other tri-
bunals makes for confusion and lack of uniformity in judicial
action. Even considering the district courts and the Court of
Claims as a unit, we find an indefensible procedural tangle caused
by the retention of the suit against the collector-"an anomalous
relic of bygone modes of thought."23
The existing system of appellate review of Board cases is
perhaps more responsible for the present excessive amount of
tax litigation than any other single factor. This system is
marked by a unique procedure under which the decisions of the
cases; in the fiscal year 1937-1938, 12 per cent or 380 of the 3094 cases
were tax cases. About 82 per cent of the tax cases in the Supreme Court,
and 87 per cent in the circuit courts of appeals, involve the income tax;
2 per cent in the Supreme Court and 8 per cent in circuit courts of appeals
involve the estate tax; and the remaining cases involve other taxes. Figures
for earlier fiscal years are given in Traynor, supra note 1, at 1429. For the
cases in the district courts and the Court of Claims, see note 21, infra.
20. In the fiscal year 1938-1939, the Board closed 1311 dockets by deci-
sion; in the fiscal year 1937-1938, it closed 1108 dockets.
21. In the fiscal year 1936-1937, the district courts decided 185 income
and estate tax cases and the Court of Claims 60 cases. The annual aver-
ages for the fiscal years 1934-1935, 1935-1936, and 1936-1937 were 201 cases
for the district courts and 52 for the Court of Claims. In the fiscal year
1938-1939 about 137 income and estate tax cases were decided by the dis-
trict courts. In the same year, there were about 58 such cases decided by
the Court of Claims, and about 27 in the fiscal year 1937-1938.
22. While the assertion of a deficiency is a prerequisite to Board juris-
diction, a taxpayer may claim an overpayment in a case pending before the
Board.
23. George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose (1933) 289 U. S. 373, 382.
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Board, numbering about 1,100 a year, are subject to review by
eleven tribunals, the circuit courts of appeals and the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. The Board is thus com-
pelled to function under the guidance, expressed in decisions,
dicta, and reasoning, of eleven masters. It is obvious that cer-
tainty and finality can under this system come only with decision
by the Supreme Court. That Court, however, will rarely review
a circuit court of appeals decision in the absence of a conflict,
so that the usual result is certiorari denied.2 4 But as the denial
of certiorari means not that the decision is right but that it does
not merit review at that time whether right or not, excessive
litigation to produce a conflict and thus force review by the
Supreme Court is the inevitable result. Professor Traynor cites
instances where certiorari has been denied to a circuit court
of appeals decision but years later, after a conflict has developed,
certiorari has been granted and a decision rendered which is
contrary to that reached in the earlier circuit court of appeals
case in which certiorari was denied.21 With such litigation comes
a disparity in tax law from circuit to circuit. Often a decade
may pass before uniformity is restored through a decision of
the Supreme Court. For example, in 1930 the Board of Tax
Appeals decided that a loss realized by a taxpayer on a sale of
property to a corporation wholly-owned by him was not a de-
ductible loss. 26 In 1934 this decision was reversed by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.27 The Supreme Court
denied certiorari.21 Thereafter the ninth, eighth and second cir-
cuit courts of appeals rendered similar decisions. 29 The Board
24. In the fiscal year 1938-1939, petitions for certiorari were filed in
about 123 tax cases and the petition was denied in 97_cases; in the fiscal
year 1937-1938, there were about 146 petitions filed and 100 denials. About
80 per cent of the eases involve the income and estate taxes.
25. Traynor, supra note 1, at 1409.
26. B. B. Jones (1930) 18 B. T. A. 1225.
27. Jones v. Helvering (App. D. C. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 214.
28. Helvering v. Jones (1934) 293 U. S. 583.
29. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Eldridge (C. C. A. 9, 1935)
79 F. (2d) 629; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. McCreery (C. C. A.
9, 1936) 83 F. (2d) 817; Foster v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C.
C. A. 2, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 130; Smith v. Higgins (C. C. A. 2, 1939) 102 F.
(2d) 466; Helvering v. Johnson (C. C. A. 8, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 140. Per-
haps the seventh circuit court of appeals should be added to the list. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue v. Edward Securities Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1936)
83 F. (2d) 1007, aff'g per curiam Edward Securities Corp. (1934) 30 B.
T. A. 918.
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bowed before these authorities and likewise allowed such losses.30
But the Commissioner persisted in his view that the losses were
not deductible. In 1939 his persistence bore fruit when the cir-
cuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit decided a case on
a theory contrary to the other decisions.31 The Supreme Court
consequently granted certiorari to review the question, and in
1940 rewarded the Commissioner's tenacity with a decision deny-
ing the deductibility of such losses.32 But between the consider-
ation of the issue by the Board and its final determination by
the Supreme Court was a decade of uncertainty and litigation.3
The judicial procedure which Professor Traynor suggested as
a substitute for the present system is as follows: Original juris-
diction in all income, estate, and gift tax cases would be confined
to one tribunal, the Board of Tax Appeals, which would be given
jurisdiction over refunds as well as deficiencies. To expedite
consideration of the cases and to compensate for the elimination
of the localized district courts, the Board would be decentralized
into five boards, each composed of three members and having
exclusive jurisdiction in a defined geographical area. Appeals
from these five boards would be taken as a matter of right to a
single Court of Tax Appeals, whose decisions in turn would be
subject to review on certiorari by the Supreme Court. Denial
of certiorari to a decision of this court would mean that a final
answer had been obtained to the issue involved, for there would
be no opportunity to compel later Supreme Court review as at
present exists through the device of producing a conflict. It is
suggested that a new Court of Tax Appeals be created, or that
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia or the Court of Claims be enlarged for this purpose.
Statistics are presented to prove the feasibility of this and the
other suggestions.
30. E. g., Corrado & Galiardi (1931) 22 B. T. A. 847; A. S. Eldridge(1934) 30 B. T. A. 1322, aff'd in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Eldridge (C. C. A. 9, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 629; Ralph Hochstetter (1936) 34
B. T. A. 791.
31. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Griffiths (C. C. A. 7, 1939)
103 F. (2d) 110, rev'g George W. Griffiths (1938) 37 B. T. A. 314.
32. Higgins v. Smith (1940) 60 S. Ct. 355; cf. Griffiths v. Helvering
(1939) 60 S. Ct. 277, aff'g Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Griffiths
(C. C. A. 7, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 110.
33. Nor is the uncertainty ended in view of the four-to-four affirmance
in Helvering v. Johnson (1940) 60 S. Ct. 293, of the decision in Helvering
v. Johnson (C. C. A. 8, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 140, allowing the loss where the
taxpayer's wife owned 49 per cent of the stock in the vendee corporation.
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These suggestions likewise precipitated aflurry of criticisms, 34
for the most part coupled with admissions, sometimes express,
sometimes tacit, that the existing picture had been fairly por-
trayed. Few of the criticisms appear convincing. With respect
to the shift of district court jurisdiction to the Board," there
is little substance in the contention that the opportunity to ap-
pear before a district court in a tax case is essential to the
maintenance of "confidence and cooperation between the citizen
and his government." Integrity and fairness can exist even
though a person be called "Member" rather than "Judge." If
need be, the guarantees thought to be inherent in life tenure
may be supplied. Likewise, it does not seem to follow that
abolition of the suit against the collector with the consequent
elimination of the jury trial in tax cases would result in the
destruction of a barrier which "has become a traditional local
right" and which, "whether used or not, is a real factor in
preserving confidence in the judicial remedy." As a matter of
fact, there were only four jury trials in the fiscal year 1938-
1939 and five in the fiscal year 1937-1938, so that it is difficult
to believe that our ancient liberties would be swept aside if the
jury trial were eliminated.
The suggested decentralization of the Board has given rise to
the criticism that the present uniformity of Board decisions will
be replaced by conflicts among the new Boards, as dissenting
opinions will become coordinate decisions. But we find that the
same critics look upon the present conflict of decisions among
the circuit courts of appeals as healthy. In any event, conflicts
among the Boards would not be readily engendered in view of
the right of appeal to the proposed Court of Tax Appeals. More-
over, the suggested decentralization of the Board is really a
question of detail. The important point is that the Board should
hold hearings in the various localities with such regularity that
petitions filed with it may move to hearing without delay.
Prompt consideration by the Board of the petitions filed with it
would insure orderly and effective consideration of cases in the
34. See articles cited in note 10, supra.
35. It has often been recommended that the Board should be given juris-
diction over refund claims concurrently with the district courts. While this
proposal in itself would be unobjectionable, it is merely a half-way measure
that would serve to make existing facilities more convenient to taxpayers
but would not remove the basic difficulties.
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administrative stage, for both taxpayer and the Government
would know that the filing of a petition means a trial in a few
months rather than a year or more of delay. It has been sug-
gested that the Board establish regular calendars in the various
important cities, the frequency of the hearings being determined
by the number of proceedings in each locality. But as over 95
per cent of the cases are now heard outside of Washington,
whether the expeditious consideration of cases be achieved under
the present method of decentralized hearing and centralized deci-
sion or under the proposed method of decentralized Boards is
not of much moment.
The proposal for a single Court of Tax Appeals to exercise the
appellate review now possessed by the circuit courts of appeals
was the target for the greatest barrage of criticisms. A typical
contention was that the goal in tax litigation is a "truly right
answer" and that conflict among the circuit courts of appeals
aids in achieving this objective. Whatever may be true of the
existence of "truly right" decisions in other fields of the law,
with respect to many, if not most of our tax cases, the rightness
or wrongness of the decision is not the only concern. Certainty
and uniformity are equally compelling criteria of the judicial
review of tax cases, and neither can be achieved if conflicts are
encouraged and finality long delayed. Many a tax question is no
nearer a "right" decision after four or five circuit courts of
appeals have battled over it than when the first court pro-
nounced its judgment. All that has happened is that each of the
several reasonable but contradictory positions has been given
the stamp of judicial approval. Meanwhile a confused Bureau
and bewildered taxpayers, who would be quite content to adjust
themselves to the first decision if it were left unchallenged, are
forced to struggle along as best they can until the Supreme
Court selects one of the available alternatives and it becomes the
"right" answer, at least until Congress acts. Coupled with the
argument of the "right" answer is the plea for "greater as-
sistance from the Supreme Court in the development of the sys-
tem of taxation" and the consequent criticism of any system of
review which would deprive tax cases of that Court's "broad
vision." Only a handful of tax cases, however, involve far-reach-
ing consequences, and these would in any event be considered
by the Supreme Court under the proposed system. And one may
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well believe that an already burdened Supreme Court would be
quite content to exercise its broad vision in cases more provoca-
tive than the humdrum, technical tax matters with which it is
now forced to deal by reason of conflicts among the circuit courts
of appeals.36 Another criticism grounds itself, not upon the de-
sirability of conflicts, but upon the theory that the Board and
the Commissioner should follow a decision of a circuit court of
appeals as it is "high authority," so that conflicts may be thereby
eliminated. Many tax decisions, however, cut two ways, so that
while a decision may in one situation give the advantage to the
taxpayer, in another situation the advantage will go to the Com-
missioner. With taxpayers in all the other circuits free to liti-
gate the question, the Commissioner's acquiescence will not end
the controversy on the issue. Likewise, a realistic Commissioner
sworn to protect the revenues cannot drop an issue after defeat
in one circuit when experience tells him that he has a real chance
to secure a different result in another circuit and ultimately to
win in the Supreme Court.
The principal criticism of a single Court of Tax Appeals runs
along the following lines: Tax law is not an isolated distinct
branch of the law but is influenced by, and in fact dependent
upon, the general substantive law. The large majority of tax
cases, perhaps 80 per cent of the important cases, turn on some
principle of substantive law. Specialized tribunals are therefore
not sufficiently equipped to deal with tax cases, and the broad
experience of the circuit courts of appeals in the field of sub-
stantive law is necessary to prevent the segregation of tax law
and its decline to "a maze of artificial and highly technical rules."
Tax practice would be confined to "so-called tax experts" and
"a specialized tax bar," so that the taxpayer would be deprived
of the services of attorneys who are "trained and experienced
in the fundamental principles of jurisprudence" and who possess
"broad vision and wide experience in the general practice of the
law." The dire results predicted to follow the creation of a single
Court of Tax Appeals should make us squirm a bit when we
think of the specialized Board of Tax Appeals and our tax bar.
The validity of the criticism depends on the answers to three
questions: What percentage of tax cases does turn on principles
36. Cf. Lowndes, Taxation and the Supreme Court, 1937 Term, Part II
(1938) 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 165, 200.
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of non-tax law? How adequately could a tax tribunal deal with
such cases? Are the advantages of a single Court of Tax Appeals
to be preferred over the disadvantages which may perhaps exist
as a consequence of the answers to the first two questions? The
first question is relatively unexplored. Professor Traynor's sur-
vey indicates that only about 10 per cent of the cases turn on
"local" substantive law.37 The number of tax cases which are
dependent upon general substantive law may be higher but pre-
sumably not very much so. The second question also has not
been fully answered, although Professor Traynor indicates that,
in most of the above 10 per cent of the cases, the substan-
tive law could readily be determined by a single reference to the
case or statutory law of the jurisdiction involved. A study of
the tax decisions of recent years along the lines indicated by
these two questions would be most helpful, for none of those who
have resorted to this argument has buttressed it with factual
or statistical data. Until these questions are answered, there
can be no answer to the vital third question, that of balancing
the various considerations involved in a single Court of Tax
Appeals. One may hazard a guess, based, as seem to be the
assertions of those who have raised objections on this score,
upon mere working acquaintance with tax decisions, that the
answer to the first question would be "A comparatively small
number of cases," to the second question, "Quite adequately,"
and to the third, "The balance lies with the single Court of Tax
Appeals."
Some critics have raised a constitutional barrier to the crea-
tion of a single Court of Tax Appeals, asserting that the tax-
payer is entitled as of right to be heard in a constitutional court
and, therefore, as the proposed court would be legislative in
nature, the suggested procedure lacks due process of law. One
may never speak with confidence in a field in which even the
Supreme Court speaks with authority only. The ad hoc deci-
sions respecting legislative and constitutional courts, however,
seem to indicate that more authority rests with the proposition,
that the single Court of Tax Appeals could be constituted as a
constitutional court if an intermediate court of that nature were
required, 8 that the opportunity for review by the Supreme Court
37. Traynor, supra note 1, at 1431-2.
38. Ex Parte Bakelite Corp. (1929) 279 U. S. 438, holding the Court
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would seem adequate to provide the consideration by a constitu-
tional court if such consideration at some stage were requisite, D
and that due process of law is not denied if the taxpayer is
limited to review by a legislative court created under the revenue
powers of Congress. 40
A geographical objection is also raised against the proposal
by reason of the inconvenience that would be caused taxpayers
through the location of the court in Washington. While it may
be thought that this argument of inconvenience was lost when
the Capitol was located in Washington, it is quite likely that the
inconvenience could be reduced through periodic sessions of the
court in four or five geographically representative cities.
The preceding discussion has concerned itself with the prob-
lems presented by the existing system of judicial review, the
proposals offered in solution of these problems, and the objec-
tions that have been made to these proposals. In the field of
administrative procedure, the Government has acted to eliminate
the admitted difficulties which the old procedure had produced.
Its adoption of the decentralized procedure is a bold step which
promises much needed reform in tax administration. But no
action has yet been taken to meet the perhaps more critical prob-
lems of judicial procedure. One recognizes that traditional judi-
cial ground is not so easily trod upon and that emotional reac-
tions respecting the established judicial order are only slowly
overcome by the soundest arguments. However, those who claim
-an interest in the proper functioning of our tax machinery, who
wish to offer to the taxpayers a law as free from controversy
as an income tax will permit but at the same time an expeditious,
of Customs Appeals, now the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and
Williams v. United States (1933) 289 U. S. 553, holding the Court of
Claims to be legislative courts, rely mainly on the historical treatment of
the subjects dealt with by these courts. O'Donoghue v. United States (1933)
289 U. S. 516, likewise rests heavily upon history in finding the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia to be both a constitutional and a legis-
lative court. The argument of history would, as regards taxation, seem
to permit Congress to create a constitutional court to hear only tax cases
if it so desired. It would appear that Congress possesses the power to choose
one or the other type of court in this regard and therefore could make its
intentions clear as to the choice adopted.
39. Cf. Anniston Manufacturing Co. v. Davis (1937) 301 U. S. 337.
40. Cf. the statements in Ex Parte Bakelite Corp. (1929) 279 U. S. 438,
'both as to the treatment of claims against the United States (at 452) and
the creation of the Court of Customs Appeals by Congress under its powers
to lay and collect duties on imports and to adopt any appropriate means of
-carrying that power into execution (at 460).
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orderly method of resolving the disputes that do arise, who de-
sire to supplant undesirable conflict and confusion with reason-
able uniformity and certainty, can find no phase of our present
tax system more urgently in need of critical reexamination than
the present system of judicial review.
III. CLOSING AGREEMENTS-THEIR FUNCTIONS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
The provisions authorizing the Treasury Department to enter
into closing agreements under the internal revenue laws have
received almost no attention from writers in the administrative
field, and slight notice from even those whose interests are con-
fined to tax administration. The general unfamiliarity with these
provisions justifies a preliminary description.
The closing agreement made its first statutory appearance in
the Revenue Act of 1921. 4 The Treasury Department had been
urging for some time that it be given authority finally to close
tax cases. It said that:
At present the taxpayer never knows when he is through.
Every time an old ruling is changed by court decision, opin-
ion of the Attorney General, or reconsideration by the De-
partment, the Department feels bound to apply the new
ruling to past transactions. The necessity of constantly cor-
recting old returns and settlements is as distressing to the
Department as it is obnoxious to the taxpayer.
42
Only the running of the statute of limitations on assessments
served to establish a final barrier to the claim of the Government
for additional taxes, so that prior to that time a taxpayer could
not safely consider a tax year as closed. It will be recalled that
under the Revenue Act of 1918 the period of limitations with
respect to assessments was five years, and under the Revenue Act
of 1921 it was four years. Congress responded to this plea by
inserting Section 1312 into the Revenue Act of 1921, providing:
That if after a determination and assessment in any case
the taxpayer has without protest paid in whole any tax or
penalty, or accepted any abatement, credit, or refund based
on such determination and assessment, and an agreement is
41. (1921) 42 Stat. 313, c. 136, sec. 1312.
42. H. R. Rep. No. 1035 (1920) 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 3; cf. H. R. Rep-
No. 350 (1921) 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 15; Sen. Rep. No. 275 (1921) 67th
Cong., 1st Sess., 31-32; (1921) 61 Cong. Rec. 5202.
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made in writing between the taxpayer and the Commis-
sioner, with the approval of the Secretary, that such deter-
mination and assessment shall be final and conclusive, then
(except upon a showing of fraud or malfeasance or mis-
representation of fact materially affecting the determination
or assessment thus made) (1) the case shall not be reopened
or the determination or assessment modified by any officer,
employee, or agent of the United States, and (2) no suit,
action, or proceeding to annul, modify, or set aside such
determination or assessment shall be entertained by any
court of the United States.43
Like provisions, with but a minor change, appeared in the Reve-
nue Acts of 1924 4 and 1926.45
The device thus adopted to bar a tax year against further
changes in tax liability, prior to the running of the statute of
limitations, was a written agreement entered into between the
Commissioner and the taxpayer, approved by the Secretary, and
made final by statute as respects both Government and taxpayer.
It will be noted that several limitations were placed on the use
,of such an agreement. There had to be both (1) a determination
and assessment by the Commissioner, and (2) payment by the
taxpayer of any tax or penalty, or acceptance by him of any
abatement, credit, or refund, consequent upon such determina-
tion and assessment. Moreover, the agreement was confined to
the over-all statement that such determination and assessment
were final and could not refer merely to the treatment of a single
item. These limitations were reflected in the number of closing
agreements entered into under the three Revenue Acts which
contained the provision quoted above:
Number of Agreements
Calendar Year Income Tax
1922 117
1923 469
1924 582
1925 310
1926 293
1927 834
43. (1921) 42 Stat. 313, c. 136, sec. 1312.
44. (1924) 43 Stat. 340, c. 234, sec. 1106. The words "after protest"
were eliminated.
45. (1926) 44 Stat. 113, c. 27, sec. 1106(b), (1929) 26 U. S. C. A. sec.
1249 (b).
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The House Ways and Means Committee was thus in a position
to state in 1928 that:
The closing of tax cases for the earlier years is a difficult
problem. Statistics recently gathered show that an abnor-
mally large percentage of closed cases are reopened by the
taxpayer or the Government. Among the causes contribut-
ing thereto are claims by taxpayers, the effect of subsequent
court decisions and changes in the regulations and the law.
The constant reopening of closed cases must be discouraged
and one of the most effective means of preventing the re-
opening of cases is the execution of closing agreements.
Such agreements are authorized by Section 1106 (b) of the
Revenue Act of 1926. There are, however, a number of
restrictions in that Section, the practical effect of which is
to delay and often to render it impossible to secure the
agreement.46
The desire to increase the use of closing agreements was con-
curred in by the Treasury Department. Section 606 of the Reve-
nue Act of 1928 was therefore adopted to supersede the prior
provisions relating to this subject. It provided:
(a) Authorization.-The Commissioner (or any officer or
employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, including the
field service, authorized in writing by the Commissioner)
is authorized to enter into an agreement in writing with any
person relating to the liability of such person (or of the
person or estate for whom he acts) in respect of any in-
ternal revenue tax for any taxable period ending prior to
the date of the agreement.
(b) Finality of agreements.-If such agreement is ap-
proved by the Secretary, or the Undersecretary, within such
time as may be stated in such agreement, or later agreed
to, such agreement shall be final and conclusive, and, except
upon a showing of fraud or malfeasance, or misrepresen-
tation of a material fact-
(1) the case shall not be reopened as to the matters
agreed upon or the agreement modified, by any officer,
employee, or agent of the United States, and
(2) in any suit, action, or proceeding, such agree-
ment, or any determination, assessment, collection, pay-
ment, abatement, refund, or credit made in accordance
therewith, shall not be annulled, modified, set aside, or
disregarded 7
46. H. R. Rep. No. 2 (1928) 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 32-33.
47. (1928) 45 Stat. 874, c. 852, sec. 606, (1935) 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 1660.
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This new provision dispensed with the need for a detelmina-
tion and assessment followed by payment or refund of tax. A
closing agreement thus became permissible in any situation in-
volved in a closed taxable year. The immediate result of this
statutory change was a widespread use of closing agreements.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue adopted the policy of requesting
an agreement in every case in which the tax liability shown on
the taxpayer's return had been increased or decreased after audit
and examination. Even though no change in tax liability was
made, an agreement was requested if the tax exceeded $50,000.48
It will be observed that the Government was thus the moving
party in concluding closing agreements. Behind its desire for
such agreements was the necessity of reducing the large accumu-
lation of cases from prior years. The following figures reflect
the change:
Number of Agreements
Calendar Year Income Tax
1928 38,381
1929 141,421
But it soon became evident that the pendulum had swung much
too far. The large number of agreements made impossible their
adequate review. The Bureau rapidly learned to its sorrow that
in many instances additional taxes were owing but were uncol-
lectible because a closing agreement had been concluded with
the taxpayer. Likewise, taxpayers possessing valid grounds up-
on which to base refund claims found that the agreement barred
recovery of the overpayments. As the closing agreement was
entered into upon the urging of the Bureau, it was natural that
these taxpayers gave expression to their wrath in severe criti-
cism of the Bureau. The immediate result was an abandonment
of the policy of soliciting closing agreements from taxpayers
and the adoption in 1930 of a practice of entering into such
agreements only when they were requested by taxpayers or
where for some special reason it was to the Government's inter-
est that the case be closed. This change in policy resulted in a
precipitate decline in the number of closing agreements. It was
followed in 1934 by a Mimeograph"9 closely restricting the use
48. Mimeograph 3697 (1929) VIII-1 Cum. Bull. 118; Mimeograph 3728
(1929) VIII-1 Cure. Bull. 124.
49. Mimeograph 4149 (1934) XIII-1 Cum. Bull. 162. The provisions of
this Mimeograph are similar to those quoted on p. 429, infra.
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of closing agreements and by a more careful review in the
Treasury of agreements concluded by the Bureau, and the de-
cline continued. By 1937 the drop had been so pronounced that
only 161 agreements were entered into in that year. The follow-
ing figures tell the story:
Number of Agreements
Calendar Year Income Tax
1930 87,687
1931 4,763
1932 3,241
1933 1,950
1934 349
1935 302
1936 318
1937 161
The Revenue Act of 1938 contained two important provisions,
not related to the preceding history of closing agreements, which
are bound to have a significant effect upon their use. The first
provision altered the prior language by eliminating, after "any
taxable period," the words "ending prior to the date of the agree-
ment," so that a closing agreement could be entered into "for
any taxable period."50 The second provision was the specification
of a closing agreement as a final determination of tax liability
for the purposes of Section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938.
These two provisions, 51 which were carried over into the Internal
Revenue Code,52 will be discussed later.
As the law now stands, the scope of a closing agreement may
be summarized as follows :5
(1) A closing agreement may be made with respect to any
internal revenue tax.5 4
(2) The closing agreement may refer to past tax years
which are already closed, to a present tax year not yet ter-
minated, or to a future tax year which has not yet com-
menced.
50. (1938) 52 Stat. 573, c. 289, sec. 801.
51. (1938) 52 Stat. 573, c. 289, sec. 802, provided that closing agreements
could be approved by an Assistant Secretary, as well as by the Secretary
or Under Secretary.
52. The present provision respecting closing agreements is Internal Reve-
nue Code (1939) 53 Stat. 462, sec. 3760.
53. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, Appendix, par. 47. Cf. Paul and Mertens, The
Law of Federal Income Taxation (1934) secs. 45.01-45.18.
54. Only a few agreements are concluded with respect to taxes other than
the income tax.
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(3) The closing agreement may pertain to the total tax
liability for a tax year (including the absence of any lia-
bility) or to the tax consequences of any particular matter
or item, such as a reorganization, a bad debt, et cetera.
(4) The closing agreement may relate to issues of law,
to issues of fact, or, to pay homage to the Supreme Court,
to "a mixed question of law and fact."'"
Under present practice, the closing agreement provided for in
Section 3760 of the Internal Revenue Code serves three inde-
pendent functions, which we may now consider.
A. Use of closing agreement to close a past tax year.
As the preceding discussion indicated, the function which the
closing agreement was originally intended to serve was the final
closing of a completed tax year. At the time of the agreement's
introduction, the statute of limitations was comparatively long
and did not offer adequate protection against unforeseen changes
in tax liability. Today, however, the period of limitations upon
assessment and refund with respect to the income tax is in gen-
eral three years. It is questionable whether this relatively short
period of uncertainty can be reduced any further without too
great a sacrifice on both sides. Most taxpayers actually enjoy a
shorter period, for if their returns are examined, found adequate,
and stored away in the year following their filing by the tax-
payers, they will rarely be disturbed. Shifts in judicial inter-
pretation during the three-year period can hardly affect such
taxpayers, for the Bureau cannot keep a cross-index of tax items
involved in the various returns. If the taxpayer by refund seeks
to take advantage of a shift in interpretation, he of course in-
vites closer inspection of his return. Those taxpayers whose re-
turns merit detailed inspection will not be able to consider their
tax as finally determined until the entire three-year period has
elapsed. But the difficulties of inspection and examination of
such returns prevent any mechanical shortening of the period.
Indeed, for many of these taxpayers the three-year period is not
sufficient for a thorough examination and a resort to waivers is
necessary. It has been suggested that the period of limitations
be reduced to, say, eighteen months except in special cases where
the Bureau, in a specified manner, indicates that more time is
55. Helvering v. Tex-Penn. Co. (1937) 300 U. S. 481, 491.
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necessary. Yet it hardly seems worthwhile to substitute a rigid
and complex procedure for one which accomplishes the result
sought by such a provision and at the same time is elastic and
simple of administration.
There does not appear to be any need for the Commissioner
to exercise the power conferred with respect to closing agree-
ments in a broad fashion, so as to achieve finality in a shorter
time than is now afforded by the statute of limitations. The
sparing of finicky taxpayers from the vicissitudes of judicial or
administrative changes in interpretation within the three-year
period does not overbalance the administrative inconvenience
that such closing agreements would involve if entered into on
a large scale. It is one thing to file away a return at the end of
a year and go on to the next year's work, and another to enter
into a binding agreement with the taxpayer at the end of such
year with respect to his tax liability. Even the taxpayer him-
self, upon reflection, would not be anxious to sign away his right
to a refund without very careful checking. The proper approach
is one which the Bureau has adopted-steady improvement in
the technique of auditing returns. The resort on a large scale
to the formality of the closing agreement to obtain speedier final-
ity would mean only the repetition of a serious mistake.
Although it is undesirable to utilize closing agreements in a
broadside manner merely to hasten absolute finality, there un-
doubtedly are special cases in which such finality must be ob-
tained promptly. Thus, a corporation seeking to recapitalize or
reorganize, may be required to issue a statement concerning its
tax liabilities for past years. Bureau practice recognizes this
and similar needs, and the current Mimeograph states:
Ordinarily no closing agreement, Form 866, with respect
to any internal revenue tax will be entered into except where
there appears to be an advantage in taking such action, as
in cases where, in the settlement of disputed issues, the tax-
payer and the Government have made mutual concessions.
Where, however, the taxpayer is able to show sound reasons
for desiring a closing agreement and it is shown that the
Government will sustain no disadvantage through the ac-
ceptance of the agreement, an application for a closing
agreement will not be rejected solely because there is no
apparent advantage to the Government. Examples of such
cases are: estates, where the fiduciary desires a final closing
agreement in order that he may be discharged by the court;
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corporations in the process of dissolution which desire a
final closing agreement to wind up their affairs; cases where
in connection with the taxpayer's financial affairs, creditors
demand evidence of a final determination of tax liability;
and cases where taxpayers desire to follow the consistent
practice of so closing their returns from year to year."
Tax attorneys who have experienced difficulties in securing clos-
ing agreements may perhaps be surprised at this language. It
can hardly be contended that the language is unduly restric-
tive. The Mimeograph fairly and clearly states the proper func-
tion of closing agreements for taxable years already closed.
While one may grumble at the application of the expressed policy
in a particular case, a quarrel cannot be picked with the policy
against which variant cases are to be tested. As respects this
function of the closing agreement-that of providing finality as
to the treatment of a past tax year-little more can be desired
of the policy standards adopted by the Bureau.
B. Use of the closing agreement as a determination under
Section 3801 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Section 3801 of the Internal Revenue Code, formerly Section
820 of the Revenue Act of 1938, is designed to mitigate the hard-
ship caused by the statute of limitations in cases where taxpayer
or Commissioner has successfully maintained an inconsistent
position." Suppose the taxpayer has erroneously included an
item of income in his gross income for 1936. After the period of
limitations has expired with respect to 1936, the Commissioner
correctly asserts a deficiency for 1938 on the ground that the item
belongs in the taxpayer's gross income for that year. Formerly,
if the Commissioner were successful the taxpayer would be in
the unfortunate position of having paid tax twice on the same
item. Today he is permitted to obtain a refund, with interest,
of the portion of the tax for 1936 erroneously paid with respect
to the item. Obviously no adjustment for the earlier year should
be made until the tax liability for the later year has been finally
determined and the second inclusion of the item in gross income
is beyond recall. A court or Board of Tax Appeals decision sus-
taining the asserted deficiency would, on becoming final, consti-
56. Mimeograph 4821 (1938) XVII-2 Cum. Bull. 254.
57. Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, Section 820 of the Revenue Act of
1938 (1939) 48 Yale L. T. 509, 719.
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tute such a determination. Or if the deficiency were paid and
refund claim filed, a disallowance of such refund claim, followed.
by a failure to bring suit within the two years allowed for the
institution of a suit by the taxpayer, would provide the necessary
finality. But these determinations are of a litigious nature and
long delayed. Suppose the taxpayer is willing to acknowledge
the soundness of the Commissioner's later position and to pay
the deficiency, so that he may obtain an adjustment for the
earlier year. Yet mere payment of a deficiency is not a crossing
of the Rubicon; a change of mind the next day will bring a re-
fund claim which may turn out to be successful. To avoid un-
necessary delay and litigation where the taxpayer is willing to
pay the deficiency and at the same time to insure the finality of
such payment, Section 3801 provides that a closing agreement
with respect to the item in question constitutes a final determi-
nation permitting adjustment for the error in the earlier year.
Taxpayers aware of the restrictive Bureau policy on closing
agreements were quite sceptical of their being able to obtain
such agreements in connection with Section 3801 and accordingly
criticized the Section. Yet their criticisms completely overlooked
the difference in the function served by the closing agreement
under that Section. To secure the traditional closing agreement,
the taxpayer quite properly had to show a special need justify-
ing the examination that the Bureau would be compelled to make
in self-protection. But under Section 3801 the taxpayer is ac-
quiescing in the Bureau's assertion of a deficiency and desires
a closing agreement confirming that acquiescence in order to
obtain the consequent adjustment for the earlier year. The clos-
ing agreement is thus a mere formality, whose presence, how-
ever, is indispensable to the proper functioning of the Section.
Moreover, the agreement can be restricted to the item in ques-
tion, so that the remaining items for the year are left unaffected.
There is thus no reason for the Bureau to refuse to enter into
closing agreements for this purpose and Bureau practice recog-
nizes this fact.5s
This use of the closing agreement as a mere formality designed
58. Mimeograph 4821 (1938) XVII-2 Cune. Bull. 254 states at 256: "A
closing agreement should be executed and submitted for approval whenever
such action is deemed appropriate under the provisions of section 407 or
section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938." Cf. Maguire, Surrey and Traynor,
supra note 57, at 723-4.
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to start in operation another provision of the revenue laws has
administrative consequences. Section 506 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code in a somewhat comparable situation relies upon a clos-
ing agreement confirming a deficiency under the tax on personal
holding companies to set in motion the' deficiency dividend ma-
chinery. It is quite likely that in the future additional devices
will depend upon the conclusion of a closing agreement. The
number of closing agreements concluded each year should there-
fore greatly increase. Yet the closing agreement machinery is
still geared to the function first served by the agreement. Thus,
approval by the Secretary, the Under Secretary, or an Assistant
Secretary is required. Such a requirement, even if understand-
able with respect to the function of the closing agreement first
described, is just so much red tape when the closing agreement
itself is a mere formality. Even review by the Commissioner
appears unnecessary in such a case.
One may also question these and like mechanics when applied
to the traditional closing agreement. Congress possesses the be-
lief that the closing agreement device is fraught with the possi-
bilities of favoritism and apparently for this reason has refused
authority to the Commissioner to conclude such an agreement
without Treasury review.50 Yet the many decisions made daily
to issue or not to issue a deficiency letter permit of the same
favoritism. So, also, does the settlement of a case before the
Board of Tax Appeals. Nevertheless, the issuance of deficiency
letters and the settlement of Board cases now rest with the Staff
Divisions in the field and are not subject to review in Washing-
ton. Where in the settlement of disputed issues the taxpayer and
the Government have made mutual concessions, it is desirable
that the settlement be final. If the settlement occurs in connec-
tion with a proceeding before the Board, the desired finality is
afforded by the Board order. As indicated above, the Staff Divi-
59. The Senate Finance Committee in 1938 recommended that the Com-
missioner be authorized finally to approve closing agreements, under regu-
lations approved by the Secretary, and the Senate Bill embodied this sug-
gestion. Sen. Rep. No. 1567 (1938) 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., 46. The Confer-
ence Committee rejected this change, and instead permitted an Assistant
Secretary to approve closing agreements, in addition to the Secretary or
Under Secretary. Compromises received a similar treatment, in that the
Under Secretary and an Assistant Secretary were permitted to approve
compromises before suit. Sen. Rep. No. 1567 (1938) 75th Cong., 3rd Sess.,
47. Revenue Act (1938) 52 Stat. 578, c. 289, sec. 815. Cf. Seidman, Legis-
lative History of Federal Income Tax Laws (1938) 772-774.
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sion alone concludes the settlement. But if the settlement occurs
prior to petition to the Board, absolute finality can be obtained
only through a closing agreement, whose adoption involves re-
view and consideration in Washington. Yet the settlement before
the Board binds the Government as effectively as the closing
agreement. No reason is therefore apparent why a different
procedure should be required in the case of the agreement. For
these reasons it would be desirable to reconsider the administra-
tive mechanics applicable to closing agreements of each type and
the extent of the review that is necessary.
C. Use of the closing agreement as a binding declaratory ruling
for the future.
The two preceding functions of the closing agreement concern
completed tax years and past transactions. The closing agree-
ment serves only to impart that finality to the tax consequences
which it is agreed should be ascribed to the completed transac-
tions. Its function does not differ in kind from that performed
by the doctrine of res adjudicata or the statute of limitations;
the closing agreement merely advances the time of finality. The
Revenue Act of 1938, however, permitted closing agreements to
reach into the future and thereby opened for exploration an en-
tirely new field of tax administration.
Prior to 1938 the Bureau policy with respect to rulings on the
tax consequences of contemplated transactions had crystallized
into a definite refusal to issue such rulings. Mimeograph 4589,
issued in 1937, stated:
The Bureau is receiving a large number of requests from
taxpayers and their counsel for rulings which relate to the
character and extent of tax liabilities resulting from pros-
pective as distinguished from contemplated transactions.
Except upon specific authorization by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue or as indicated in (a) below, the estab-
lished policy of not complying with such requests will con-
tinue to be followed. Rulings will continue to be made only
under the following circumstances:
(a) The transaction must be completed and not
merely proposed or planned, except where the law or
regulations provide for a determination by the Commis-
sioner of the effect of a proposed transaction for tax
purposes, as in the case of a transfer coming under the
provisions of Sections 901-904 of the Revenue Act of
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1 1932, or an exchange coming under the provisions of
Section 112 (i) of the Revenue Act of 1936.0
The fact that such rulings would not be binding upon the same
or a successor Commissioner, as the celebrated Couzens case
proved,6 1 the belief that taxpayers would impose upon the Bureau
through repeated requests for rulings on slightly altered facts
until the most favorable situation were disclosed, and the fear
that the Bureau might be tricked into undesirable rulings, all
played a share in shaping this policy. On the other hand, how-
ever, was the inability of the honest taxpayer to obtain admin-
istrative guidance with respect to the tax consequences of a pro-
posed transaction. A corporation might be faced with a complex
reorganization in which the tax factor was a substantial one.
Despite the ambiguities of the reorganization provisions and
their constantly shifting interpretation, the corporation was
forced to construe the law at its peril. Administrative "gui-
dance" could come only in the form of a deficiency letter. The
House Ways and Means Subcommittee in 1938 thought the bene-
fits to be derived from real administrative guidance outweighed
the possible evils, and recommended "appropriate statutory pro-
visions * * * giving to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
discretionary authority to make declaratory rulings.01 2 Presum-
ably in response to this recommendation, the Revenue Act of
1938 removed the restriction which had confined closing agree-
ments to past taxable years. A taxpayer and the Commissioner
may now enter into a binding agreement fixing the tax conse-
quences of a contemplated transaction.
The desirability of this change was indicated at once. In the
same Act Congress had provided in Section 112 (b) (7) that if
complete liquidation of a domestic corporation occurred in the
month of December, 1938 and in the manner prescribed in such
Section, the recognition of the gain to the stockholders attribut-
able to the increase in value of the corporation's assets would,
contrary to the general rule, be postponed until the distributed
assets were disposed of by the stockholders. The tax benefit to
be derived from such liquidation was considerable. The only
60. (1937) XVI-1 Cum. Bull. 536.
61. James Couzens (1928) 11 B. T. A. 1040.
62. Report of a House Ways and Means Subcommittee on A Proposed
Revision of the Revenue Laws (1938) 79, 55. Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 1860 (1938)
75th Cong., 3rd Sess., 67.
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stumbling block was the necessity of strict compliance with the
requirements of the Section, for if it were later determined by-
a court that one of the requirements had not been met, it would
be too late to make amends. Moreover, the whole liquidation
had to be completed in December, 1938. Taxpayers solved this
problem by bringing their plans of liquidation to the Bureau and
obtaining closing agreements confirming their compliance with
the specified requirements. After the agreements were con-
cluded, the liquidations followed. There could thus be no litiga-
tion on the matter and no defeated expectations on the part of
the taxpayers.
The closing agreement has served this new function for about
a year and a half. In that time the tax consequences of between
fifty and sixty contemplated transactions have been ruled upon
in closing agreements. The actual number of such agreements
concluded in this period is about a thousand, as one transac-
tion may involve many agreements.6 3 Roughly 90 to 95 per
cent of these agreements relate to the reorganization provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code-recapitalizations, mergers,
reorganizations, Section 112 (i) exchanges, et cetera. But the
remaining agreements cover a wide variety of situations-deter-
mination of tax problems under aircraft construction contracts
in applying the Vinson-Trammell Act,64 March 1, 1913 value of
stock or real property, the present value of securities, the basis
of property acquired on foreclosures, the gain or loss that would
be recognized on a contemplated sale, the taxability of a stock
dividend, the amount of income that would be realized on a pro-
posed cancellation of indebtedness, the allocation of a cost basis
among various securities, and so on. The current Mimeograph
calls attention to other situations in which such a closing agree-
ment may be used to advantage. It states that "a closing agree-
ment as to specific matters, Form 906, should be secured when-
ever the taxpayer and the Commissioner have concurred in the
63. Wenchel, What Is Going On In The Chief Counsel's Office (1939)
25 A. B. A. J. 761, (1939) 17 Taxes 641; Wenchel, The Treasury's New
Powers as to Closing Agreements (1938) 16 Tax Mag. 651. In 1938 there
were 364 closing agreements under the income tax and in 1939, 1,221 agree-
ments. The increase in each year is due principally to the closing agree-
ments respecting future transactions. In addition, many rulings in future
transactions have been made but not embodied in closing agreements, as the
taxpayers desired merely to ascertain the position of the Bureau.
64. (1940) C. C. H. Fed. Tax Serv. par. 6113.
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disposition of an item and such closing agreement is considered
necessary to insure consistent treatment of such item in any
other taxable period.165 Thus the Commissioner may contend
that an item of income belongs in gross income for 1939 and
not in a later year as the taxpayer asserts. If the taxpayer ac-
quiesces in the Commissioner's contention, he may protect him-
self by obtaining a closing agreement stating that the item will
not be included in gross income for a later year. Or, a taxpayer
may claim stock became worthless in 1939 and the resulting loss
was a proper deduction for that year. If the Commissioner denies
the deduction as premature, a closing agreement may state that
if in any future year the deduction is denied because it properly
belonged in 1939, that year will be reopened to permit allowance
of the deduction.
Problems in the administration of this new policy come to
mind at once:
(a) Prevention of "fishing expeditions." The Bureau obvi-
ously cannot be turned into a vast information bureau. Congress
quite properly recognized that the granting or refusal of a clos-
ing agreement must be in the complete discretion of the Com-
missioner.66 In practice, a taxpayer desiring a closing agreement
respecting a future transaction must first satisfy the Bureau that
a sound necessity underlies the request. If this is done, the
Bureau will then work out an agreement, even permitting
changes in the contemplated transaction when the conferences
on the agreement disclose their desirability. The Bureau has so
far found that the privilege of obtaining administrative guidance
has not been abused by taxpayers.
(b) Ascertainment of facts. The Bureau must possess suffi-
cient and reliable factual information upon which to base the
ruling. Generally such information has been supplied by tax-
payers; in some instances it has been gathered by independent
investigation in the field. As a precaution, the taxpayer's request
is made a part of the agreement, and it is stated that any mis-
statement of fact shall void the agreement.
(c) Compliance with agreement. The transaction when com-
pleted must be the same as the proposed transaction upon which
the ruling was made. In practice the closing agreement is at-
65. Mimeograph 4821 (1938) XVII-2 Cum. Bull. 254.
66. H. R. Rep. No. 1860 (1938) 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., 67.
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tached to the taxpayer's return by the Bureau or a notation made
which permits the field force to ascertain if the requisite cor-
respondence exists. In some cases the taxpayer has obtained a
second closing agreement confirming his compliance with the
transaction described in the earlier agreement.
(d) Proper protection respecting basis and other aspects of
the transaction. If the transaction is a reorganization, for ex-
ample, it is not sufficient merely to agree that no gain or loss
will be recognized if it is consummated. The Commissioner in
self-protection must see that the agreement fixes the basis of
the property involved with respect to any future disposition.
Likewise, all parties to the reorganization must be bound by the
ruling, so that some of the tax-payers involved may not later
obtain a different result through litigation. Thus, on a Section
112(b) (5) exchange, the basis of all of the parties should be
fixed. In practice, where a reorganization involving many stock-
holders is the subject of a closing agreement, the Bureau obtains
agreements from the important stockholders. In one case, in-
volving over 450 stockholders, agreements were obtained from
each stockholder. Necessarily, the burden of securing such sub-
sidiary agreements falls upon the taxpayers seeking the main
agreement.
(e) Effect of future statutory changes. Whatever may be the
power of one Congress to delegate to the Commissioner authority
to bind a future Congress, no such authorization was intended
in connection with the innovation introduced by the Revenue Act
of 1938. The Regulations recognize this important limitation on
closing agreements of this type, and state that "a closing agree-
ment with respect to any taxable period ending subsequent to
the date of the agreement is subject to any change in or modi-
fication of the law enacted subsequent to the date of the agree-
ment and applicable to such taxable period, and each closing
agreement shall so recite." 67 The clause included in each closing
agreement makes it clear that the term "law" refers to the
statutory law. Thus, suppose a closing agreement dealing with
a contemplated reorganization provides for the basis of the
property involved in the reorganization in the event of its future
disposition. Before the property is disposed of, Congress pro-
67. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, Appendix, par. 47.
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vides a new basis in connection with such transactions and makes
the change applicable to prior reorganizations. The basis fixed
in the closing agreement must yield to the statutory rule. But
the closing agreement is not to be set aside merely because a
later court decision indicates that it embodies an erroneous inter-
pretation of the statute, for the very essence of the agreement is
its supremacy over the judicial interpretation.
This function of the closing agreement is still in its infancy.
The small number of agreements concluded respecting contem-
plated transactions indicates that taxpayers are not yet aware
of the potentialities of the closing agreement. An increased real-
ization of the numerous advantages which such agreements may
serve will undoubtedly be accompanied by many more requests
for rulings. All this points to the necessity of evolving standards
which may guide the Bureau and taxpayers in the use of such
closing agreements. For example, should such agreements be
limited to contemplated transactions whose tax consequences
relate to only one year, such as the profit on a proposed sale,
or should they be applied even to those transactions whose tax
consequences cover a number of future years? In turn, the latter
transactions may be further divided. A tax-free reorganization
has consequences both in the year of consummation, when the
consequence is the non-recognition of gain or loss, and in each
succeeding year through the effect of the reorganization on the
basis of the property involved. But here the prime question is
that of consistency of treatment. It is not of much moment that
Taxpayer A obtains a closing agreement providing the reorgani-
zation is tax-free, whereas Taxpayer B in a similar case receives
judicial decision that the exchange is taxable. Such lack of uni-
formity is not very disturbing. But suppose Taxpayer A creates
a trust under an alimony agreement and secures a closing agree-
ment which, in accordance with the existing view, confirms his
tax liability for the income therefrom during the life of the trust.
Taxpayer B establishes a similar trust but does not desire a
closing agreement, although he includes the income in his return.
Years later, however, the judicial interpretation shifts and Tax-
payer B then successfully contests his liability to tax on the
trust income.6 Because of the closing agreement, however, Tax-
68. Cf. the approach to alimony trusts of the second circuit court of
appeals in 1936 in Helvering v. Brooks (C. C. A. 2, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 173,
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payer A will not be able to secure the benefit of the changed
interpretation and must continue to pay tax on the income of
his trust. If such lack of uniformity is undesirable, then per-
haps closing agreements should not be entered into by the Bureau
in transactions of this type. In other words, in what situations
and to what extent should taxpayers, and the Commissioner, be
able to acquire blanket insurance against future judicial deci-
sions? The problems presented by this type of closing agreement
are of course very similar to those inherent in the application to
the revenue laws of the doctrine of res adjudicata.6 9
In addition, the administrative problems that are bound to
follow from increased use of closing agreements must be ex-
plored while there is time carefully to consider their solution.
As was pointed out above, the administrative system evolved for
the traditional closing agreement is not desirable where the
agreement is a mere formality. It would likewise seem unsound
to adopt wholesale for the administration of agreements relating
to transactions that are only contemplated a system designed to
deal with completed transactions. As the closing agreement with
respect to contemplated transactions involves many important
policy considerations, the control of such agreements should be
centralized close to the policy officers of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and the Treasury. The significant possibilities which
the closing agreement possesses for achieving some certainty in
a tax system that is today marked by extreme uncertainty must
be developed to their fullest extent. Such development requires
a sound administrative basis and for this reason the present sys-
tem should be carefully tested to determine the extent of possible
improvement.
At the same time, experimentation with this technique will
better equip us to consider the desirability of a much broader
and more complex system of declaratory administrative rulings.
One such system, making provision for extensive hearings by
the Commissioner, the issuance of rulings affecting large classes
of taxpayers, the issuance of rulings upon the initiative of the
Commissioner, the judicial review of such rulings, and the effect
with its later approach in Helvering v. Leonard (C. C. A. 2, 1939) 105 F.
(2d) 900.
69. Cf. Paul, Selected Studies in Federal Taxation (2d series, 1938) 104,
140.
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of such review upon taxpayers affected by the rulings but not
parties to the litigation, has been described elsewhere.7 There
are some who feel that the closing agreement is all that is neces-
sary; there are others who insist that the closing agreement is
not an adequate substitute for a system of declaratory adminis-
trative rulings. The merits of the controversy do not even con-
cern us except for the observation that an answer might well
await further development of the potentialities of the closing
agreement in this field.
CONCLUSION
Three topics have been suggested for study-improvement in
the general administrative procedure, with special emphasis on
the problems of decentralization; complete reexamination of the
present system of judicial review of tax controversies; and de-
velopment of the closing agreement to provide tax certainty with
respect to certain contemplated transactions, together with a
revision of the closing agreement procedure designed to bring it
in harmony with the various functions now served by the agree-
ment. The discussion of these topics is not intended as an indi-
cation that they are the only problems remaining for the student
of tax administration. Limitations of space prevent considera-
tion of many other problems equally in pressing need of solu-
tion. The absorbing question of the scope and effect of Treasury
Regulations remains as baffling as ever despite, or perhaps be-
cause of, recent Supreme Court decisions in this field.71 The
present law is here so uncertain that the only solution may be
the formulation of statutory rules providing a comprehensive
treatment of the subject. Another provocative subject, which
has long been neglected, is the development of criteria for judg-
ing proposed legislation of a retroactive nature. The Revenue
Act of 1939, although nearly Lilliputian in size as compared with
a standard Revenue Act, contained eight retroactive provisions,
about as many as were included in the Revenue Acts of 1932
70. Traynor, Declaratory Rulings (1938) 16 Tax Mag. 195.
71. Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1939) 306 U. S. 110; Estate of
Sanford v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1939) 308 U. S. 39; Helver-
ing v. Wilshire Oil Co. (1939) 308 U. S. 90; Helvering v. Hallock (1940)
60 Sup. Ct. 444; Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Con-
struction (1940) 49 Yale L. J. 660; Surrey, The Scope and Effect of
Treasury Regulations Under The Income, Estate and Gift Taxes (1940)
18 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 556; Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire
Oil Case (1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 252.
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through 1938. Despite the present trend toward such provisions,
there are no criteria available to enable the Congress to decide,
as a matter of legislative policy rather than of constitutional
limitations, when to be stern and when to be merciful in response
to requests for retroactive relief. In another field, there is the
vital question of an Administrative Code. The Congress in 1939
took a long step forward when it codified in an Internal Revenue
Code all of the statutes relating to the internal revenue in force
on January 2, 1939, and enacted that Code as absolute law. But
the Code made no substantive changes in the existing statutes, so
the task still remains of modernizing the provisions of the Code.
Such modernization is especially needed with respect to the ad-
ministrative provisions of the Code. The provisions regarding
assessment and collection of the various taxes and the antiquated
and detailed administrative provisions of the miscellaneous taxes
could stand complete overhauling. The Treasury Department is
undertaking the first and most formidable step in that task, that
of preparing a tentative Administrative Code as a working basis.
It will probably present a suggested Administrative Code before
the end of the year. Such a Code obviously demands painstaking
analysis and study on all sides. Consequently, when this Admin-
istrative Code is ready for critical examination, it will afford
all who are interested in tax administration an opportunity to
perform genuine service in the improvement of our tax system.' 2
Mention of these few additional topics should serve to indicate
that there are many challenging problems which require immedi-
ate and concrete solutions. Long-range improvements need not
and should not be abandoned. But the fact remains that those
who desire a system of tax administration that will effectively
serve both taxpayers and the Government, have it within their
power to provide such a system for the present and are not forced
to think only of a distant future.
72. Cf. address by Roswell Magill, formerly Under Secretary of the
Treasury, before the American Institute of Accountants, September 29, 1938.
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